Implications
of Rapid Economic Growth
For Thailand’s Political
Structure
By Mr. Anand Panyarachun
5th International Conference
on Thai Studies
Soas, London
July 5, 1993
Outsiders
looking to Thailand are usually impressed by its economic performance. In the
last three decades Thailand has chalked up economic growth rates that have averaged
in excess of 7 per cent per annum. From an economy once consisting mainly of poor
farmers, a largely Chinese trading class and a few wealthy individuals in Bangkok,
we now have a more diversified economy and a more complex social structure to
match. Those whose last visit to Thailand was in the late 1950s, will see vast
changes in the material fabric of Thai life today.
If
you probe deeper and consider the way Thais think about their own society and
the world around them, there is less change to discern. You will, however, sense
considerable anxiety, because Thais have increasingly to square their very rapid
economic changes with the much slower changes in their beliefs and assumptions
about their society and the world.
Furthermore,
different groups of people have benefited from economic growth at different rates,
leading to considerable shifts in the focus of economic and financial power. Again,
people’s assumptions about the functioning of the social system need to be adjusted.
It
is in the political sphere that many of the anomalies that arise from rapid economic
growth come to a head. Unlike in the economic sphere, we of this generation have
not been left with a healthy legacy from our forefathers. The Absolutist State
of the early Ratanakosin era gave way to benevolent and enlightened absolutism
of Rama IV and Rama V. In their pursuit of modernism these benevolent autocrats
created a Western-style bureaucracy. It was a necessary component of their drive
for modernization, but in the end the bureaucracy turned against its masters and
in 1932 took over the helm of the state, supposedly in the name of the people.
Between 1932 and 1973, the civilian and military bureaucracies jointly held undisputed
control of the country’s economy and polity.
The
long dominance of the bureaucracy over the political life of the country has been
detrimental to the development of rational political structures. The Absolutist
State acted paternalistically to raise the welfare of the masses as part of its
ideology. During the era of bureaucratic dominance, a similar emphasis on paternalism
continued. Instead of its being part and parcel of a monarchist ideology, which
emphasizes the loyalty to and the obligations of the King, in the post-1932 world,
the State--an abstract entity--was to be supreme and the fount of paternalism.
Ordinary people competed to obtain a share of the paternalistic largesse, but
they did not have any say on how the State was run, still less on who was to run
it. These prerogatives belonged firmly and squarely to the bureaucracy, particularly
its military wing.
In this atmosphere,
it is not surprising that the development of political parties did not progress
very far. For one thing, their lives were often cut short by the frequent coups,
but even when they re-emerged during the infrequent democratic interludes, they
were short of policies, platforms and ideology. They had little money and lacked
good organization. Because they could not aspire to capture State power, they
continued to look at the State as the fount of patronage and encouraged their
voters to believe the same, by promising that they, rather than their rivals,
would be better at extracting that patronage from the State.
During
this era, participation in affairs of State was not so much unthinkable as futile.
A culture of dependence on the largesse of an almost alien State took hold among
the non-bureaucratic sections of the population, not least among the businessmen
who wanted to move ahead.
However, since
businessmen were the spearheads of Thai economic growth, their relationship with
the State evolved more rapidly and harmoniously than other sections of the population.
From being mere clients of the bureaucratic elite (primarily the military), businessmen
soon forged an alliance with them, and began to use State power to ensure monopolistic
control for themselves and protection for their industries.
The
increased pressure of business interests among the bureaucracy soon led to the
erosion of the solid core of organizational unity that characterized the military.
After 1973, the total dominance of the military over the Thai polity in the previous
four decades could no longer be sustained. Extra-bureaucratic influences began
to exert more pressure on the levers of the State. Political parties, however
weak and disorganized, had now become permanent fixtures of government, becoming
among other things conduits of power for provincial business interests.
Meanwhile,
on the economic front, radical changes took place in the international economy
in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973. Being an export-driven economy, the
need to adjust to the more demanding international environment forced the Thai
government to liberalize its economy, strongly led by its economic managers, commonly
termed the “technocrats”.
The continued
growth of the economy also led to a massive expansion of the business sector,
creating in its train a sizable middle class that no longer needed to depend on
government employment.
There was also a
discernible shift in the middle classes’ approach to politics. Although many businesses
continued to cut deals with politicians on behalf of their own interests, there
are now increasing numbers who disdain such deals and whose conscience and professional
management have led them to oppose such practices. Instead, these individuals
seek to promote more their class interest, to use an expression now somewhat out
of fashion. The growth in numbers and prestige of trade associations such as the
Federation of Thai Industries, the Board of Trade and so on is testimony to a
different outlook among businessmen. These organizations have become lobbyists
for large-scale legal and regulatory reforms.
Associated
with this has been the growing internationalization of the Thai economy, which
demands that Thai businesses and other actors in the economy, not least the government
itself, increasingly conform to standards that are set abroad. These overseas
standards have to be met partly because of the competition in the marketplace.
However, we should not overlook direct pressures through such multilateral mechanisms
as the GATT or the unilateral coercion of the infamous Section 301 of the U.S.
trade law.
In their attempts to come to
terms with the Thai State, the progressive sections of the business community
are finding that they are ill-served by the political parties, whose evolution
has been far less rapid than that of the business world. Their attempt to penetrate
to the corridors of power via the political parties have until recently been largely
unsuccessful, mainly because traditional political leaders remained suspicious
of these businessmen, although the events of 1991/1992 have changed that somewhat.
Generally,
however, political parties still prefer to deal only with businessmen who have
stuck to the timeworn tradition of seeking special favours for themselves in exchange
for contributions to the parties or to party members. The reason for this preference
is clear. Parties need enormous sums to finance election campaigns, which have
become more and more expensive over the last two decades.
Money-politics
has a long historical root. I have alluded to the political culture in which most
Thais, particularly rural Thais, look to the State as an alien power. In this
respect the State is a bit like the spirits and goblins that are such an important
part of Thai beliefs. To be sure, the State, like these extra-terrestrial beings,
has to be placated, but special favours can also be asked of it. In both cases,
there are procedures for obtaining favours, and there are selected individuals
who mediate between the requestor and the alien power. In the old days the mediators
between the State and the individual were the village headmen and the kamnans.
Now, the local Member of Parliament is increasingly assuming that role.
While
this view of the Alien State, acting as a patron, is steeped in tradition, money-
politics is a cancerous outgrowth of the tradition. This cancer is on its way
to reaching catastrophic proportions, as it is affecting the economy on which
our political system has been feeding. There are now whole areas of business where
kickbacks are routine. It has been said that Thai industry rests not on “know-how”
but on “know-who”.
Another impediment
to the development of clean government in Thailand is the over-developed sense
of gratitude ingrained in the Thai character. If you do me a good turn or do me
a personal favour, I and my family, shall forever remain indebted to you. Payment
in kind -- votes promised and delivered -- is a rule rather than an exception,
particularly in the rural areas.
Money-culture
is also a worrisome feature of our society. So long as wealth, irrespective of
how it is derived, is viewed with awe and respect and tends to be synonymous with
power and authority, potential candidates and members of parliament are directly
or indirectly encouraged to go out of their way to amass fortunes.
Wealth
commands following and status and is often sought after unscrupulously. Men and
women of integrity and honesty consequently find electoral process and politics
incompatible with their moral ethics and show reluctance to be involved.
Corruption
is indeed a fact of life in Thailand today, but it is a fact of life which is
widely abhorred. Thus the military has found in corruption among our elected politicians
the best excuse for coups d’etat since the demise of the Communist threat. It
is of course an excuse, but the excuse has worked because there is a deep thread
of public disaffection with electoral politics and its associated corruption.
There
is thus a new label, a new justification for attacking government institutions,
including democratic ones. The watchword is “corruption”.
The
metaphor of corruption as cancer suggests that the root cause of corruption arises
from deep within the society, and that its cure will be daunting, perhaps even
unattainable. The current electoral law does not have sufficient safeguards to
deter the influence of money-politics, and the system of multiple-member constituencies
may actually encourage it. Political parties continue to be a euphemism for clans,
and have only very recently begun to attract well-educated and experienced individuals
to go through the electoral process.
Under-lying
these problems is the vast social and economic gap between urban and rural Thailand,
which generates a set of attitudes on both sides that do not make for good and
responsible citizenship. Rural Thailand looks to Bangkok as the eternal fountain
of wealth which is to be tapped by their members of parliament, and opts
to elect those candidates whose main qualifications are their ability to
deliver the goods to their home constituencies. Urban Thailand tends to look down
on these representatives who place parochial interests over and above greater
needs of the country. Consequently, while Bangkokians have taken to the streets
to fight (and die) for democracy, they have tended to be quickly disillusioned
by the results of the democratic elections for which they fought. The lack-luster
performances of a large majority of members of parliament have given rise to this
disenchantment.
There is, let there be
no doubt about it, a strong current in Thailand, as in Japan and Italy, in favour
of “clean hands” in politics. The central question which awaits an answer is “Who
will bell the cat?”. We do not have the institution of the magistracy that has
been such a powerful instrument in the current revolution in Italy, nor is our
prosecutor’s office as potent as the Japanese one.
Consequently,
many among us have always had a hankering for “knights on white horses” to release
us from the thrall of corruption, notwithstanding the fact that many of these
“knights” were themselves notably less than paragons of honesty and integrity.
Do
we then have no grounds for hope at all? I believe we have, but the first condition
for hope and for solution is to stop searching for the “quick fix”. Despite a
long tradition of coups and general political instability, I believe that Thai
history has been marked by slow, continuous evolutionary change rather than by
radical moves in political structure or ideology. I therefore expect future changes
to be more in that tradition -- a muddling through, rather than a sudden dawn
of enlightenment.
If we put ourselves in
that frame of mind, then I believe there are some grounds for hope. Thailand has
been singularly fortunate among the developing countries for being a relatively
homogeneous country, ethnically and religiously, and with an enlightened and highly
revered monarchy as the focal institution for the nation as a whole. Because there
are no over-riding ethnic, religious or ideological differences among the various
sections of the population, pragmatism is allowed a full play in our approach
to political and economic problems.
It
is because of these reasons that the wounds inflicted by the events of May 1992
are being quickly healed.
Since then, the
institution of the parliament has emerged considerably strengthened. It appears
that the current government will last through its normal term. In any case, there
is every reason to expect that the current constitutional system will not again
be aborted by another coup d’etat. If so, then a few more successive elections
will ensure a firmer foundation for the full development of political parties
and system in Thailand. The balance of political forces will hopefully shift from
a patronage-based political system toward a more issue-oriented one. If this happens,
politics will begin to attract a different and, I dare to hope, a better kind
of politician into the fray.
Finally, the
long period of economic growth that Thailand has been enjoying will begin to yield
political dividends. Thais are now living in urban areas in larger numbers than
ever before. We all know that this rapid urbanization is exacting a high social
toll, but in the urban constituencies, with higher educational content, will be
a force for improvement. There is an urgent need, however, to raise the overall
level of education.
These are the sorts
of things I see occurring “naturally” in the normal course of events. That does
not mean that we cannot give history a little nudge. I have already identified
the underlying cause of the Thai political malaise to be the vast social and income
gaps, between the rural and urban populations. Attacking this problem is to me
an essential ingredient in any attempt to improve the political climate of the
country.
A two-pronged approach appears
to me to be necessary. At the individual level, improving the rural population’s
access to a higher level of education is an essential first step. While more than
90 per cent of children now attend primary school, attendance at the secondary
level is still low. For the children of today’s farmers to improve their lot in
a more competitive world of the future, a longer period of schooling seems be
a necessary first step.
Expanding educational
opportunities without a vibrant economy in rural Thailand will lead to its rapid
de-population-witness what is happening now. The individual rural family’s access
to education must also be complemented by its access to more rural jobs and information.
It
is imperative that the industrialization now taking place in Bangkok and its environs
be spread more evenly around the country. If and when this takes place, we can
see an emergence of a rural middle class that can make better and more effective
use of their greater autonomy in managing local affairs and issues. Decentralization
of authority and the national budget to the provincial level would also accelerate
the efficacy of democracy at grass roots.
Success
of democracy is also predicated upon well-informed public. The right to be informed
and un-encumbered access to information is a necessary pre-condition for active
public participation in decision-making processes. This trend is becoming increasingly
evident in present - day Thailand.
All
in all, therefore, despite a history in which political development lags well
behind the growth of the country’s economy, I am cautiously optimistic that, with
proper management, politics in Thailand will become more participatory and cleaner--and
above all, more transparent and meaningful.
When
one looks at Thai history, one can see that the Thai nation has weathered many
storms over the past 700 years. Because of our resolve and fine sense of balance,
we have managed each time to overcome these crises and survived as a national
entity. True, we may be agonizingly slow in coming to a solution, but in the end
we always muddle our way through. I have no reason to believe that history will
not repeat itself!